



Informal insurance in the presence of poverty traps:  





Ph.D. Student, Cornell University 
Christopher B. Barrett 
International Professor, Cornell University 
 
 
Contributed paper prepared for the 26
th  Conference of the  
International Association of Agricultural Economists 





© Copyright 2006 by Paulo Santos and Christopher B. Barrett.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies.   1
Informal insurance in the presence of poverty traps: 




Recent empirical work finds evidence of highly nonlinear wealth dynamics among Boran 
pastoralists of southern Ethiopia, consistent with the hypothesis of poverty traps. This 
paper explores the consequences of such dynamics for informal inter-household transfers. 
Using original primary data on social networks and transfers, we find that asset transfers 
respond to recipients’ losses, but only so long as the recipients are not “too poor”. The 
persistently poor are excluded from social networks and do not receive transfers in 
response to shocks. We also find some evidence that the threshold at which wealth 
dynamics bifurcate may serve as a focal point at which transfers are concentrated. This 
suggests that asset transfers, in the context of poverty traps, may aim to insure the 
permanent component of income generation, rather than the transitory component, as 
standard insurance models assume.  
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1. Introduction 
Risk is a central feature of life in rural areas of developing countries. Economic 
theories of risk sharing, rooted in the work of Arrow (1964), Diamond (1967) and Wilson 
(1968), posit that individuals will use a variety of instruments – most notably for our 
purposes, informal insurance based on interhousehold transfers (Townsend 1994, Lim 
and Townsend 1998) – to shield consumption from the idiosyncratic variation in income 
that is commonplace in these settings. Models of informal insurance are based on the 
strong, if often only implicit, assumption that the income generating process is stationary 
or, in other words, that shocks only have transitory effects. For example, Coate and 
Ravallion (1993, p.4) justify their focus on symmetric insurance arrangements with the 
assumption that “either player could end up ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ in any period” with equal 
probability.
1 The assumption that income processes are stationary provides the basis for 
an all-inclusive insurance pool.
2 
Yet a growing literature, recently reviewed by Azariadis and Stachurski (2004), 
emphasizes the possibility of nonstationary income processes that may yield multiple 
dynamic equilibria, with one or more stable equilibria below the poverty line – a low- 
level equilibrium (poverty) trap.
3 What implications, if any, might poverty traps have for 
the functioning of informal insurance networks?   
                                                 
1 The same assumption is true in Ligon et al. (2002) in the case of nonstationary transfers. 
2 The next section discusses some models that emphasize limits on the size of the insurance group without 
abandoning the assumption of stationary income processes. 
3 Some of this literature emphasizes the role of uninsured risk as a as a root of poverty, generally 
emphasizing the role of ex ante choices and intended to diminish the impact of shocks (e.g., Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig 1993, Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis 2000, Carter and Barrett 2006).  See Dercon (2004) for 
a review of this relation.     3
The theoretical literature on poverty traps posits the rational exclusion of the poor 
from welfare-improving opportunities, such as informal insurance contracts.  This occurs 
because, under limited commitment, agents must use informal sanctions to ensure that 
contracts are respected and sanctions have less “bite” for those who have little to lose 
(Banerjee and Newman 1995). This is not, however, the only possible rationale for being 
selective about with whom to insure. 
In the presence of multiple dynamic equilibria, small transfers can have large 
welfare impacts if, in the wake of a shock with potentially long lasting or permanent 
effects,
4 they succeed in making the recipient cross the unstable dynamic equilibrium at 
which path dynamics bifurcate. If a poverty trap exists, then the unstable dynamic 
equilibrium may serve as a focal point for interhousehold asset transfers since this is the 
point at which the long-term welfare impact of a transfer is greatest. Transfers might then 
be appropriately conceptualized as a mechanism to defend households from falling onto a 
path of sustained asset loss and eventual destitution. Although the available data do not 
allow a conclusive test between these two models, we present evidence based on 
simulations of expected wealth dynamics that seems to favor this latter explanation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly outlines a 
simple model of informal insurance in the presence of poverty traps that shows how the 
resulting patterns of interhousehold transfer may differ from the stationary case of an all-
inclusive insurance pool, with wealth playing a central role in determining who is and is 
not included. Section 3 then introduces the setting we study and the data we use, 
                                                 
4 The possibility that shocks may have long lasting or even permanent effects is addressed in, for example, 
Martorell (1999), Ravallion and Lokshin (2005), Dercon (2004) and Dercon and Hoddinott (2004). In our 
case, such shocks would be those that leave the individual below the path dynamic threshold.   4
collected from southern Ethiopian Boran pastoralists, a population among which 
nonlinear wealth dynamics characterized by poverty traps has been reasonably well 
established (Lybbert et al. 2004, Santos and Barrett 2006a). In section 4 we study 
informal insurance links among the Boran and find that respondents’ decision to give 
cattle to an individual is not unconditionally triggered by the prospective recipient’s 
losses – as it would in the canonical insurance model – but depends on the match’s losses 
conditional on herd size – as a model that takes into consideration the existence of 
poverty traps would predict. This result is robust to a series of additional controls, namely 
for individual-specific ability that Santos and Barrett (2006a) find influences herd 
dynamics. We further explore whether these decisions seem to be influenced by a 
prospective transfer recipient’s position relative to the unstable asset equilibrium – the 
accumulation threshold identified by Lybbert et al. (2004) and corroborated by Santos 
and Barrett (2006a) – by analyzing the effect of two variables that may drive the 
propensity to reciprocate gifts (expected wealth and expected gains from gifts).  We find 
evidence of non-monotonic relation between matches’ wealth and the formation of 
insurance links.  In section 5 we then study patterns of social acquaintance and find that 
wealth plays a role in explaining who is known within a community and thus who can 
mobilize transfers in response to shocks.  Being destitute has a strong, negative impact on 
the probability of being known and, since cattle transfers only occur between people who 
know each other, persistent poverty thereby becomes socially invisible. Finally, section 6 
summarizes these results and draws out the policy consequences of our findings. 
 
2. Transfers in the context of poverty traps   5
  A simplified version of the intertemporal decision problem facing a risk-averse 
agent i, in which utility is defined over wealth and we rule out bequest motives for 
accumulation can be written as: 
(1)   max{Jt} E { 3t= 0…T $
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shock drawn from the distribution N(C) with support on the interval [-1, 0], reflecting 
losses that could range from 0-100% of i’s initial asset stock. This formulation highlights 
both the importance of self-insurance (through ex ante asset levels, that affect the 
probability distribution function of shocks
5) and the role of informal insurance. Because 
theoretical models of poverty traps emphasize the role of asset accumulation in shaping 
welfare dynamics, we focus on asset shocks and transfers rather than on income shocks, 
as is more common in the literature on informal insurance.
6  
  The growth function that underlies the asset law of motion, g(C), must be general 
enough to incorporate two possibilities, identified in earlier work in this environment 
                                                 
5 As Lybbert et al. (2004) report, sales and slaughtering are tiny, less than two percent of herd, on average, 
among the population we study  Thus shocks (mainly mortality) are almost the unique reason for decreases 
in herd size, while increases are mostly due to biological reproduction. The importance of asset levels in 
determining the level of risk has the paradoxical effect that asset levels, in this economy, are (to a large 
extent) exogenously determined. Clearly, the simplicity of this economy facilitates the econometric 
analysis to a degree that would be harder to achieve in other contexts, where we may suppose that the role 
of agency in dealing with shocks (in choosing the level of risk to which one is exposed or to invest in 
formal financial instruments, for example) is potentially much larger. 
6 An exception is the analysis in McPeak (forthcoming). McPeak (2004) also argues that income and asset 
shocks, albeit correlated, can have different (and offsetting) impacts on household behavior (asset sales).    6
(Santos and Barrett 2006a). First, household characteristics (e.g., intrinsic ability) may 
sort cross-sectional units into distinct cohorts or clubs, c.  Second, within each club, 
agents might face nonstationary dynamics – in particular, and as hypothesized by 
multiple equilibrium models, the possibility of a critical threshold value, (
c, at which the 
welfare dynamics bifurcate, with one path, subscripted ℓ, leading to a low-level 
equilibrium and another, subscripted h, leading to a high-level equilibrium. These 
possibilities imply that for each club c=1,…, C , the asset law of motion is 
  Borrowing the terms from the growth literature, this specification can be 
simplified into a club convergence approach (as in Quah 1997) if there are no asset 
thresholds at which asset dynamics bifurcate (that is, (
c=0,
 œc), or into a threshold model 
(as in Azariadis and Drazen 1990) if there is only one club (that is, C=1).
7 If one assumes 
that g(C) is concave, and that there are no convergence clubs or thresholds, we’re back to 
the convergence model of Solow (1956) that, implicitly, underlies the consumption 
smoothing literature with its assumption of a stationary income process.  
  The insurance contract available to these agents is very simple and formally 
defined by J
ij
t = {J, 0} that is, at each period t, agent i can transfer to agent j a fixed 
amount of assets (J) or nothing at all. This dichotomous treatment of transfers is a 
reasonably accurate description of the reality of asset transfers in the setting we study 
                                                 
7 Several approaches have been recently suggested to identify convergence clubs (for example, Canova 
2004) and thresholds (for example, Hansen 2000) but not, to our knowledge, both. In the empirical section 
we’ll build on previous work (Lybbert et al. 2004, Santos and Barrett 2006a) to identify both convergence 
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(see section 3) and reduces the demand for insurance to a binary decision of whether to 
insure with a specific partner or not – in other words, to a process of dyad formation. 
  Keeping with the extant literature on informal insurance, we assume that the 
motivation for entering such contract is “balanced reciprocity” (Platteau 1997), ruling out 
altruistic reasons for such transfers. The simplest structure that allows for such a 
motivation must span two periods. In period 1, agents play a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, shocks are revealed to each agent and an agent j who has suffered a herd loss 
approaches i with a request for a transfer of τ. In the second stage, i decides whether or 
not to accept the request – that is, whether to form an insurance link with an agent.
8 
Growth then occurs. Then in period 2, transfers are reversed and j transfers τ back to i.
9 
This is obviously a simplification of complex informal insurance systems, but it captures 
the essential elements: dependence on the conscious choice to form and/or activate a 
dyadic link, state-contingent transfers, and eventual reciprocation. 
  Given this structure, transfers will be made if the expected gains from transfer 
over autarky are strictly positive 
(3)   J
ij






 (•) = EU
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i
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 (•) * 1(J
ji
2=J)  
                                                 
8 Note that we model the insurance link formation as occurring ex post of the shock – rather than ex ante of 
the shock, as is more common in the literature – in order that the structure of the model matches that of the 
data we use in section 4. 
9 One can equally conceptualize τ as a loan, a gift or an insurance payment.  As we discuss below, these are 
observationally  equivalent in the data we use.   8
and  $ < 1 is the time discount rate. Uncertainty about whether such gifts will be 
reciprocated, given their informal nature, is usually addressed through an appeal to the 
theory of repeated games. We summarize such game-theoretic structure by the function 
1(J
ji
2=J) that expresses the probability that, in period 2, agent j will reciprocate the 
original gift as a result of the rules in place, with 1(J
ji
2=J) = 1 meaning that such 
contracts are perfectly enforceable. 
  This paper explores what changes in the structure of insurance networks might 
arise from the introduction of multiple equilibria, as in equation (2). More concretely, we 
ask: do herd dynamics guide the selection of insurance partners?
10 In what follows, we’ll 
see that the answer is “no” in the convergence model and “yes” in a model with multiple 
equilibria. 
 
2.1 Stationary dynamics: convergence towards one equilibrium 
 Let  ke be the dynamic equilibrium asset value for which kt=kt-1 and consider the 
case of no clubs, g(C) a strictly concave function on assets and g(0) > 0. It is easy to show 
that ke is unique and it is clear that, as T64, the distribution of assets among the 
population will converge to a degenerate distribution characterized by prob(k=ke)=1, 
regardless of the initial distribution of assets among the population. Starting from that 
                                                 
10 At least three recent papers explore similar questions. Zimmermann and Carter (2003) show that in the 
face of income shocks, individuals near a critical asset threshold will tend to preserve or smooth their 
assets, destabilizing consumption in order to avoid an intertemporally costly collapse below the threshold. 
Following the same argument, Hoddinott (2006) shows that asset sales (oxen and cows/heifers) by 
Zimbabwean farmers depend on their position relative to an asset threshold (of two oxen, in this sample), 
with those above the threshold selling far more frequently in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Barrett et al. 
(2006) show, using data on pastoralists from northern Kenya, that income and consumption smoothing 
behavior are differentiated by wealth, with poorer households suppressing income variability while 
wealthier ones smooth consumption, a pattern consistent with the idea that the most vulnerable households 
destabilize consumption in order to protect crucial productive assets on which their future survival depends.    9
equilibrium, we need only to concern ourselves with negative shocks: in a way analogous 
to the discretization applied above to the possible contracts, let the shock be defined by 
the pair N
i
t 0 {0, N}, with -1 < N < 0, each state occurring with non-zero probability. Let 
the growth function be defined by 
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with 0 < H < |N| . With agents starting at the equilibrium ke, the value of setting Jt=J is to 
hasten convergence towards ke if one suffers a negative shock. Given that transfers are 
small relative to the equilibrium ke, convergence reoccurs in a single period, as reflected 
in equation (5).  It is clear that EU
i(J) > EU
i(0) holds for any individual. Hence, the 
insurance pool will include all agents.  The key point here is that when the underlying 
stochastic process is stationary (and abstracting from the costs of contracting), there is no 
reason to exclude prospective insurance links from one’s network. 
 
2.2 Non-stationary dynamics: the possibility of multiple equilibria 
  Consider now a growth club with multiple equilibria, ke={kl,  (, kh}, with kl 
representing the low-level stable equilibrium, kh representing the high-level stable 
equilibrium, and ( the (unstable) threshold at which the accumulation dynamics 
bifurcate, per equation (2). The transition matrix between these equilibria is presented in 
Table 1.  Each cell represents the probability of each asset position after the period 2 
shock – i.e., at the point at which j would reciprocate with a transfer of τ back to i – (the   10
columns), given the first period shock (the rows).  Table 1 thus captures the one period 
ahead wealth distribution at the moment i would ask j to reciprocate, conditional on asset 
holdings at the time j approaches i for a transfer of τ. 
  The speed of transition towards the nearest stable equilibrium is captured by ε. If 
ε>0, as we’ll maintain throughout the analysis, then the system is ergodic.
11 In the long 
run, everyone has a non-zero probability of spending time in both stable equilibria and 
initial conditions no longer matter. In a stricter definition that equates history dependence 
with lack of ergodicity, this is no longer a model of poverty traps. Note however that if 
one starts at the low-level equilibrium, then ε is also a measure of the degree of poverty 
persistence. If, as we also assume, ε is small, then transitions between stable equilibria 
are possible but the poor may spend a long time in the low-level equilibrium.
12 This 
approach adds realism to the analysis, by avoiding a deterministic model where poverty 
traps are absolute and can never be overcome, without necessarily diminishing the policy 
relevance of the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  We also assume that *, the probability of ending up at the low-level equilibrium 
if, ex post shock, one is at ( is higher than :, the probability of the same end result if one 
is above the threshold when growth occurs. To make the problem interesting, we further 
assume that kl + J < ( (a poor agent cannot reach the threshold through transfers) and kh - 
J > ( (a wealthy agent does not compromise his growth capacity by transferring J to an 
insurance partner).  
                                                 
11 More rigorously, we could have considered εl ¸ εh, and we would only need to assume that εl > 0 to get an 
ergodic system. This would overburden the notation with insignificant changes in the results. 
12 Mookherjee and Ray 2001 label this process “self-reinforcement as slow convergence”. The definition of 
poverty trap adopted by Azariadis and Stachurski (2004, p. 33) - “A poverty trap is any self-reinforcing 
mechanism which causes poverty to persist” - explicitly allows for this approach.   11
  Limited commitment translates into 1(J
ji
2=J) < 1. Can we then expect a higher 
probability of defaulting from particular types of prospective transfer recipients? Given 
that marginal utility is decreasing in k, the punishment strategies that make such contracts 
feasible are less effective when applied to those with less wealth. Because default on the 
same transfer yields greater utility for those with less wealth,
13 an ordering of agents 
emerges that is (weakly) monotonic in wealth space: 
(8)  1(J
ji
2=J| kl) # 1(J
ji
2=J | () # 1(J
ji
2=J | kh) 
  This corresponds to the usual reasoning about incentives and behavior in the 
context of persistent poverty (Banerjee and Newman 1994, Banerjee 2000). McPeak 
(forthcoming) takes this line of argument one step further, suggesting that asset transfers 
in a context quite similar to the one we study can be understood as ex ante precautionary 
savings rather than as ex post insurance.  In this case, only capacity to reciprocate the gift 
should matter to the decision to transfer assets that would be independent of the 
realization of a (negative) shock by the prospective recipient.  One can test this prediction 
empirically, as we do below. 
  A plausible modification to this model explores the idea that the receiver’s 
valuation of the original transfer may affect his decision not to default, as in the empathy 
formation model proposed by Stark and Falk (1989). If higher valuation of the transfer by 
                                                 
13 An extreme version of the argument follows from the (ad-hoc) assumption that u(kl-J) = - g. In this case, 
it is clear that those with asset stocks of kl will renege on the contract in period 2 and we only need to 
compute the probability of holding kl at period 2, conditional on asset levels in period 1, to rank the agents 
in terms of their desirability as insurance partners:  
 [ 1(Jj2=J |kj1 = kl) = ε] < [1(Jj2=J |kj1 = \)  = 1 - ^ - ^ε] < [1(Jj2=J |kj1= kh) = 1 - n- nε]. 
Note that without such certainty about defaulting, we can only use weak inequalities, as done above.   12
the original recipient leads to a smaller probability of default, due to “gratitude” or 
similar emotions,
14 then we can write 







j(C) is j’s valuation of the transfer made in period 1 and f(•) is an increasing 
function. We can write V
j(C) as a function of the gains, in terms of growth, from the 



















  Given the structure of the growth process, it is straightforward to show that 
(11) V(kl) = 0 
(12) V(() = (:– *) (1-ε) (kl – kh) > 0 
(13) V(kh) = 0 
As a consequence, 1(kl) = 1(kh) < 1((). A gift will be valued if, ex post shock, the 
potential recipient is at ( given that only then can transfers influence the equilibrium to 
which the recipient converges. If the receiver’s valuation of the gift affects propensity to 
reciprocate, the ordering of preferred agents to whom one makes transfers becomes non-
monotonic in the wealth space, with the maximum at the unstable equilibrium, (. 
  Several other explanations from the literature merit some attention, given their 
attempt to explain rational selection out of insurance contracts. The closest to our analysis 
is by Hoff (1997), who predicts matches along wealth levels. Individuals with high 
                                                 
14 See Komter (2005) and references therein on the role of gratitude as the “moral memory of mankind” and 
the psychological foundation for reciprocity and Hirshleifer (1987) for a discussion of the role of emotions 
as guarantors of contracts.    13
enough expected wealth may not invest in insurance relations because the expected 
benefits may not compensate for expected net contributions to the insurance pool. This 
result implicitly depends on the lack of convergence in incomes between agents (some 
have higher expected income than others) and relies heavily on the impossibility of 
separating insurance from redistribution due to egalitarian sharing rules, an environment 
quite different from the one that we study. In section 4 we test this model, since we use 
data from both sides of the insurance contract and control for the giver’s wealth. 
  Given that informal transfers can insure only against idiosyncratic shocks – not 
against covariate ones – asset covariance between potential insurance partners should 
matter to contracting choices, as the related literature on peer selection in micro-credit 
arrangements suggests (Ghatak 1999, Sadoulet and Carpenter 1999). Agents might 
therefore rationally opt out of insurance contracts with those whose wealth covaries 
strongly with their own wealth. We address this possibility below, as an additional check 
on our results. 
  Finally, Murgai et al. (2002) suggest that the costs of establishing insurance links 
may limit the domain of insurance links. Genicot and Ray (2003) likewise suggest that 
insurance groups may be bounded because risk-sharing arrangements need to be robust to 
deviations by sub-groups. Although these arguments do not explicitly model wealth as a 
source of friction that might prevent insurance links from forming, they offer 
complementary explanations for the behavior that we observe. In our empirical work, we 
therefore control for covariates that may reflect differences in the degree of enforcement   14
of such contracts or in the monitoring of other agent’s activity and, less perfectly, for the 




3. Boran pastoralists in southern Ethiopia 
Lybbert et al. (2004) analyze wealth dynamics among Boran pastoralists, a poor 
population in southern Ethiopia. Using herd history data for 55 households over a 17 year 
period, they show that herd dynamics follow a S-shaped curve with two stable equilibria 
(at approximately 1 and 35-40 cattle), separated by an unstable threshold (at 15-20 
cattle).  The authors suggest that this threshold results from a minimum critical herd size 
necessary to undertake migratory herding to deal with spatiotemporal variability in forage 
and water availability.  Those with smaller herds are forced to stay near their base camps, 
where pasture conditions soon get degraded, leading to a collapse of herd size towards 
the low-level stable equilibrium, while those with bigger herds can migrate in search of 
adequate water and pasture, enabling them to sustain far larger herds.  
Two other findings presented in Lybbert et al. (2004) help motivate this paper. 
First, they show that asset risk is predominantly idiosyncratic.  This creates conditions 
conducive to the implementation of welfare-improving insurance contracts among 
pastoralist households. Second, they find that insurance operationalized through inter-
                                                 
15 The relevance of Genicot and Ray (2003) is questionable in our context, given that we address the issue 
of network formation. Groups differ from networks because of the existence, in the latter, of a common 
boundary: if A establishes a link with B, the fact that B already has a link with C does not mean that A will 
also have a (direct) link with C.  Hence considerations about sub-group deviations may be less of a concern 
here than in more formalized institutions such as, for example, the funeral insurance groups studied by 
Bold (2005).   15
household gifts and loans of cattle are conspicuously limited.  On average, a household 
must lose 30 cattle more than the community average herd loss in order to trigger the 
transfer of a single cattle.  
This meager insurance payment, corroborated by other recent studies from semi-
arid African systems (Kazianga and Udry 2006, Lentz and Barrett 2005, McPeak 2005), 
seems paradoxical in the face of overwhelmingly idiosyncratic insurance risk: why would 
people bypass so many opportunities to trade? We hypothesize that one of the reasons 
may be the rational exclusion of some of members of society from such contracts due to a 
correct understanding of the nonlinear wealth dynamics in this economy.
16  
We employ two datasets. The first consists of household survey data collected 
from 119 randomly selected Boran pastoralist households in four communities  of 
southern Ethiopia.
17 These data on pastoral risk management (PARIMA) were collected 
every three months, March 2000-June 2002, and then annually each September-October 
starting in 2003, and include rich detail on household composition, education attainment 
(although very few respondents are literate or attended any school), migration histories, 
changes in herds, shocks, etc.   
The second data set includes observations of these same households’ stated 
choices of insurance matches. In order to identify the determinants of interhousehold 
transfer arrangements, we randomly matched each respondent with other respondents 
                                                 
16 Santos and Barrett (2006a).show that our respondents indeed perceive such dynamics . 
17 The data were collected by the Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) project of the USAID Global 
Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program.  Barrett et al. (2004) describe the location, survey 
methods and available variables.    16
from the PARIMA sample and asked two types of questions:
18 the first about (real) social 
acquaintance (“Do you know (name of the match)?”), the other on the possibility of 
transferring cattle as a gift if the match asked for it.
19 The latter question provides 
information on potential transfer networks and is the subject of study in the next section.  
  This approach offers one major advantage and two prospective disadvantages 
relative to previous studies of informal transfers.  Because we know the characteristics of 
both giver and recipient, no questions of bias arise with respect to the estimates of the 
transfer function due to lack of knowledge about one end of this relation (Rosenzweig 
1988, Cox and Rank 1992).  However, there are two prospective problems with this 
approach.  First, by studying links between individuals rather than the transfers 
themselves, one risks errors due to excessive discretization.  However, this is not a 
problem in our data because informal asset transfers among Boran pastoralists are quite 
small. In our sample, over the period 2000-03, there were 15 such transfers, out of which 
12 (i.e., 80%) were of 1 or 2 cattle.
20 For that reason, and with only a slight abuse of 
language, we use the terms “network formation” and “transfers” interchangeably in what 
follows.   
  Second, one might reasonably wonder how well potential transfer networks 
elicited in this manner reflect the decision process underlying the formation of real 
                                                 
18 This approach follows closely the one used by Goldstein and Udry (1999) in Ghana. Granovetter (1976) 
had earlier proposed a similar approach.  
19 We asked also about the possibility of transferring cattle as loans but the pattern of answers is virtually 
identical and gifts and loans seem empirically indistinguishable.  Out of 561 matches, in only 13 (2.3%) 
does the decision differ between loans and gifts. We therefore concentrate on transfers deemed “gifts” in 
what follows.   
20 A separate survey of cattle transfers motivated by shocks, conducted in 2004, in the same geographical 
area but with different respondents, suggests even greater dominance of small transfers: out of 112 
transfers, 102 (or 91%) were of 1 cattle, 8 (or 7%) were of 2 cattle and the remaining less than 2% were 
more than 2 cattle.[0]   17
insurance networks.  In a separate paper (Santos and Barrett 2006b) we show that 
inference with respect to the determinants of insurance networks derived from the 
approach used in this paper closely match those obtained from analysis of real social 
relations among the same population. The appeal of using randomly matched respondents 




4. Poverty traps and social transfer networks 
The basic pattern of answers to the stated insurance link questions is described in 
Table 2. Three key facts emerge clearly.  First, not everyone knows everyone else, even 
in this rural, ethnically homogeneous setting in which households pursue the same 
livelihood and there is very little in- or out-migration.  Although most people know the 
random match presented to them, almost 14% of the matches were unknown by the 
respondent. Second, social acquaintance is, for our respondents, clearly a necessary 
condition for willingness to make a transfer.
22  In only 3/68 cases did a respondent 
indicate that they would be willing to give livestock to someone they did not know. This 
makes the explanation of who knows whom – and, its corollary, social invisibility, i.e., 
who is unknown by others – an important question unto itself, one that we explore in 
section 5.  It also implies an apparently sequential problem that leads us to estimate the 
                                                 
21 The benefits of using experimental data in the study of social capital (a concept closely related with that 
of social networks) is emphasized by Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). Glaeser et al. (2000) and Barr (2003) 
both conclude that experimental evidence is mirrored by reality. 
22 Of course one can imagine situations where this would not hold (for example, someone may address a 
local patron and seek to put himself under his protection or someone may seek the help of friends of 
friends, even when they were not previously acquainted). Although theoretically possible, these do not 
seem to find support in our data.   18
determinants of transfer networks only on the subsample of those who know their match 
(Amemiya 1974, Maddala 1983). Finally, knowing people is by no means a sufficient 
condition for pastoralists to be willing to transfer animals to a match.  In just under one 
quarter of the cases where the respondent knew the match was he or she willing to give 
an animal to the match. The acquaintance between giver and receiver seems therefore to 
be necessary but insufficient for mobilizing support. 
The intuition behind these responses is that respondents perform a cost-benefit 
analysis with respect to each potential link/gift before deciding whether to give cattle 
when asked for it, answering “yes” if their subjective evaluation of the benefits exceeds 
the costs. The question then becomes what process governs that calculus. 
Under the canonical model of informal insurance and consumption smoothing, 
assuming a stationary asset process, transfers should be unrelated to one’s asset stocks 
and depend solely on a prospective recipient’s losses relative to the insurance group 
mean.  Thus matches with different herd sizes should be equally likely to receive 
transfers conditional on a similar loss experience, following the simple model in section 
2.1. Transfers would depend on above-average losses alone.  Under McPeak’s 
(forthcoming) alternative formulation, the likelihood of making a transfer should be 
increasing in a match’s herd size since wealthier partners are more likely able to 
reciprocate in the future, and past experience of shocks by the match should have no 
effect on transfers.   
The model of informal insurance under non-stationary dynamics, sketched out in 
section 2.2, offers a different set of predictions: transfers should respond to shocks 
conditional on ex post herd size. And unlike McPeak’s precautionary transfers model,   19
they should be invariant with respect to herd size in the absence of a shock.  These 
contrasting predictions, summarized in Table 3, enable us to test which model of informal 
insurance seems to best fit these data in an area where the existence of a poverty trap has 
now been reasonably well established.  
Because these households have been observed repeatedly since 2000, we can use 
actual herd size observations for each respondent and his random match to test between 
these competing hypotheses. The key variables then become (i) herd position with respect 
to the different equilibria identified in Lybbert et al. (2004) and corroborated in Santos 
and Barrett (2006a), (ii) whether or not the match lost cattle, and (iii) match’s herd size.  
As described in Table 4, we get at (i) by constructing four dummy variables that provide 
a categorical representation of household-level expected herd growth in the period after 
the survey on social transfers. A household falls in category E1 if it lies in the 
neighborhood of the low-level stable equilibrium, with a herd of less than five cattle in 
2003.  It belongs in category E2 if it lies just below the threshold at which herd dynamics 
bifurcate, with a herd of 5-14 cattle.  If the herd size was above the unstable equilibrium 
but beneath the high-level equilibrium (15-39 head), the household was classified as 
belonging to group E3. Finally, households with herd sizes at or above the high-level 
stable equilibrium (40 or more) were assigned to E4. We capture variable (ii), herd loss, 
through a dummy variable, Lj, taking value one if the match (j) had a smaller herd in 
2003 than in 2000, and zero otherwise.
23  
                                                 
23 Note also that given that in all communities, growth was positive in this period, there would be no 
change in results if we had defined this variable has taking the value 1 if the respondent had registered a 
loss above the one registered by the community, since all communities experienced net herd gains over this 
period. This would be a more precise way of defining idiosyncratic risk, although at the cost of making the 
implicit assumption of equivalence between insurance pool and the community used in the sampling 
strategy.    20
We then study respondents’ decision to make a gift or not using a model that nests 
the different explanations/motives for asset transfers under the reduced form 
(14) lij
* = αi + (1 f(hj) + H Lj + Σ t=1…4 βt Etj + δ Xij + λZi + εij      
where lij
* is the propensity to establish a link between i (the respondent) and j (the match), 
hj is the match’s herd size, the X vector captures a range of covariates describing the 
relation between i and j, and the Z vector reflects attributes of the respondent, such as 
age, household labor supply and village of residence. If we define lij = 1 as the actual 
realization of the variable lij
* when a link is formed and assume that  
(15)  εij ~ log(0, π
2/3)    
(16) E  (εij ,  εih) ≠ 0 if j ≠ h   
(17) E  (εih , εjh) = 0 if i ≠ j   
we can estimate this as a logit model through clustering of the observations on the 
identity of the respondent, premised on the idea that relations are nested within 
individuals.  
  One alternative way of modeling the error term is to incorporate the effect of 
match’s unobservables. Both Udry and Conley (2005) and Fafchamps and Gubert 
(forthcoming) correct the variance matrix for the possible effect of match’s 
unobservables, using Conley’s (1999) estimator, and find that the corrected standard 
errors do not differ significantly from estimates that do not account for this effect. We 
follow a slightly different strategy, using a nonparametric permutation test known as 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) (Hubert and Schultz 1976, Krackhardt 1987,   21
1988) to obtain correct p-values.
24 We too find that this added control for potential 
correlation on unobservables makes no significant difference to our results when 
explaining the formation of transfer dyads.  However, it does matter when explaining 
who knows whom. 
The elements of X – clan membership, gender, age, land holdings, cattle holdings, 
and household size – are expressed not as the Euclidean distance between the pair but 
rather, following Santos and Barrett (2005), using a measure of distance that allows for 
ordinal differences in the relative position of respondent and match to play a role in 
explaining the respondent’s decision.
25 This approach offers an intuitively more 
appealing interpretation of the effects of social and economic distance than the more 
conventional Euclidean measure of social distance that (implicitly) would impose 
symmetry in the effect of these variables upon the dyad formation decision.  
Table 5 presents the estimates of the logit regression when the dependent variable 
is the decision to give cattle to the match if he/she asked for it.  We present several 
specifications of this model that differ in the way we express the effects of herd losses 
and match’s wealth, thereby allowing testing among the different models outlined above.  
                                                 
24 The basic intuition behind this procedure is that the permutation of the data on the dependent variable 
must maintain its clustered nature. In practice, this means that the same permutation must be applied to 
respondents and matches. We can then estimate the above model when all correlation between dependent 
and independent variables is broken through resampling – that is, when the null hypothesis that all slopes 
equal zero is known to be true – and compare our first estimates with their empirical distribution obtained 
through the repetition of this exercise (in our case, 1000 times), to generate a sampling distribution for the 
parameter estimates. 
25 To be more concrete, consider the case of a categorical variable such as gender: we can think of whether 
match and respondent share the same gender and estimate a dummy variable “same gender” – implicitly 
imposing that the effect of a female-female match is the same of a male-male one – or we can consider the 
set of all possible matches (female-female, female-male,…) and estimate a dummy variable for each 
specific combination. Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning applies to continuous variables. With a 
different formalization, the same idea is captured in Fafchamps and Gubert (2006).   22
First, however, let us note a few results with respect to the X and Z variables 
defining relational characteristics between i and j and attributes of i, respectively. These 
results reflect possible frictions and associated costs of establishing an insurance link 
(Murgai et al. 2002) and are robust to the various specifications we report with respect to 
herd losses and herd size.  The propensity to give a gift is strongly, positively influenced 
by belonging to the same clan.  Variables that measure social distance in terms of gender 
are clearly asymmetric. Men are more willing to give cattle (either to women or to other 
men) than are women. The larger one’s household, the more likely the respondent is to 
give a gift, although that effect is attenuated when the giver’s household has more 
members than the prospective recipient’s.  Physical proximity and age have no 
statistically significant effect on transfer patterns in these data.
26   
We now turn to the core hypotheses of interest: the relation between asset 
transfers, wealth and asset shocks.  Let us start with the simplest specification, in column 
(1), in which we test for a relation between herd size and the propensity to make a gift.
27 
There seems to be no relation between j’s herd size and the likelihood that i gives j cattle.  
That result is robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for the various expected herd 
dynamics (column 2). These two specifications test the precautionary transfers model 
(McPeak forthcoming), for which these data offer no support.  Differences in a match’s 
expected capacity to reciprocate the transfer do not seem to matter to a respondent’s 
propensity to transfer cattle when considered independently of the experience of herd loss 
by the prospective recipient.  Notice also that by controlling for differences in wealth 
                                                 
26 To conserve space we omit the estimates of some of these variables from Table 7. The complete set of 
estimates is available from the authors upon request. 
27 Note that we include a dummy variable for j having no cattle.  This controls for the intrinsic discontinuity 
in the growth function due to biological reproduction when the match has no cattle.  Failure to control for 
the match having no cattle leads to a marked drop in precision of estimates.   23
between match and respondent, we implicitly test and reject Hoff’s (1997) suggestion 
that wealthier givers would be less interested in entering such insurance contracts. This 
result holds for all specifications of our model.
28 
In column (3), we introduce the effect of herd loss by the match.
29  While j’s herd 
size continues not to matter, recent herd loss by j has a pronounced positive effect on the 
probability that the respondent makes a transfer to j, with p-values below 0.05. Cattle 
transfers appear to respond to losses, as standard informal insurance models would 
predict. 
However, when we unpack this further, we find strong support for the predictions 
of the model of asset transfers in the presence of poverty traps.  When we interact herd 
loss with the appropriate expected growth path dummy variables, we find that the effects 
of losses differ markedly depending on the match’s herd size relative to the different 
equilibria (column 4).  Of course, transfers conditional on ex post asset stocks are 
incompatible with the canonical model of informal insurance based on stationary asset 
dynamics, under which all losses should trigger transfers, regardless of ex-post wealth, as 
outlined in section 2.1.  
  Table 5 also presents the p-values derived from the Quadratic Assignment 
Procedure to allow for two-way correlation in errors. Our results conform with previous 
work (Udry and Conley 2005, Fafchamps and Gubert forthcoming); we do not find 
substantial changes in the p-values of these estimates, a conclusion that does not hold in 
                                                 
28 Results that specifically estimate the effect of respondent’s wealth (at the cost of dropping match’s 
wealth, due to multicollinearity given that we also control for differences in wealth) are available from the 
authors. 
29 One gets qualitatively identical results when we interact herd size with the dummy variables for expected 
herd dynamics categories, thereby looking at variation within categories, in all specifications of this model.  
We omit those results in the interest of brevity but they are available from the authors.   24
the next section. There is nevertheless one change that deserves to be mentioned. The 
negative coefficient associated with recipients who lost their entire herd in the period 
2000-2003 is now statistically significant, a result that further reinforces our 
interpretation regarding the exclusion of those who fall into destitution and is consistent 
with the historical record, which underscores that cutting off the destitute has 
traditionally been a standard response to dire poverty among East African pastoralists 
(Iliffe 1987; Anderson and Broch-Due 1999).[0]
30 
In section 2, we allowed for the possibility that wealth dynamics may be 
characterized by club convergence as well as by multiple equilibria and Santos and 
Barrett (2006a) indeed find that differences in herding ability affect expected herd 
dynamics, in particular that lower ability herders do not exhibit multiple equilibria and 
are expected to fall into the low-level equilibrium regardless of the herd size with which 
they start.  Transfers to low ability herders are thus ineffective at insuring against the 
permanent effects of shocks irrespective of ex post herd size and should not occur in 
equilibrium under the model we developed in section 2.2.  By contrast, medium- or high-
ability herders exhibit multiple equilibria with a similar critical threshold (at 12-15 cattle) 
at which herd dynamics bifurcate, although they exhibit different high level equilibria.   
We therefore repeat the previous exercise, now controlling for estimated herder 
ability, which we generated using the data on herd evolution in the period 2000-2003, and 
stochastic parametric frontier estimation methods for panel data.  The efficiency 
parameter estimates from such a frontier provide at least a coarse proxy for herder-
                                                 
30  One possible explanation, following the results of Monte Carlo simulation presented in Krackhardt 
(1988), is that the correlation between the error terms of respondent and match is relatively small in our 
regression. Clearly, this is a result of the detailed data that we use and may not hold in other datasets and 
contexts.    25
specific ability that is not otherwise directly observable.
31 Using the predicted average 
technical inefficiency – i.e., estimated herding ability – for each herder, we divided our 
sample into three sub-samples: low ability (those in the 4
th quartile), high ability (those in 
the 1
st quartile) and a residual medium ability category (the 2
nd and 3
rd quartiles).  
Assuming herders perceive the ability of the match’s similarly to our estimates of 
the match’s ability group – a hypothesis we unfortunately cannot test – a match’s ability 
should therefore matter to a respondent’s likelihood of making a transfer.  This is 
precisely what we find in Table 6, column (1), which replicates column (4) from the 
previous table, now conditioning the interaction of cattle loss and membership in the E2 
herd size interval by the prospective recipient’s ability.   As one would predict based on 
any of the models in section 2.2, low estimated herding ability perfectly predicts 
exclusion from asset transfers, while medium and high ability matches are statistically 
significantly more likely to receive transfers of cattle than other matches.  
The results in columns (2) and (3) reinforce this finding.  The match’s ability does 
not seem to matter either unconditionally (column 2), nor for those herders near the 
threshold who didn’t suffer any losses (column 3).  Furthermore, ability does not seem to 
matter independently of one’s expected herd evolution (column 1).  
Having established that the existence of a poverty trap seems to matter to agents’ 
decision to form insurance links, we now explore which one of the two models outlined 
in section 2.2 seems to find support in our data. Our data are somewhat more limited for 
                                                 
31 More precisely, we estimated the herd growth function frontier using a composed error term that includes 
a symmetric random component reflecting standard sampling and measurement error and a one-sided term 
reflecting observation-specific inefficiency, which we assume to follow a truncated normal distribution.  
We then take advantage of multiple initial herd sizes for each herder to compute herder-specific mean 
efficiency measures, i.e., each pastoralist’s proximity to the herd growth frontier.  See Santos and Barrett 
(2006a) for details and estimation results.   26
the purpose of investigating the role of the accumulation threshold in this process, in 
particular whether it may function as a focal point where transfers are concentrated, 
thereby leading to a non-monotonic transfer function.  Because the period for which we 
have data was one of relatively good rainfall, the dominant trend in our sample is one of 
herd growth and herders who experienced asset loss are concentrated in categories E1 
and E2, preventing us from using the same approach as above to directly test whether a 
loss that would leave an herder at E3 or E4 would make him a more attractive gift 
recipient – due to superior capacity to reciprocate – than those at E2 and E1, as the more 
familiar model would suggest, or less attractive – because the wealthier recipient values 
the transfer less – as the non-monotonic transfers model would suggest.  
We can, nevertheless, use differences in the variables that directly measure the 
motivation to reciprocate the original transfer. Recall that in the first model in section 2.2, 
the probability of reciprocity increases monotonically in wealth because future defection 
is less valuable to the wealthy. We capture that effect through the variable “expected 
wealth” defined as the probability that future herd size, post transfer, will be larger than a 
specified value. In what follows, we present the results when considering the probability 
of having a herd of 30 or more cattle ten years after the transfer of one cattle, given actual 
herd size at 2003.
32 In the non-monotonic transfers model, growth gains drive this 
propensity to reciprocate.  We capture that effect through the variable “expected gains”, 
defined as the difference in expected herd size, 10 years ahead, due to the transfer of 1 
cattle given actual herd size at 2003. Both variables were created following the 
simulation procedure described in detail in Santos and Barrett (2006a) and are graphically 
                                                 
32 Other herd sizes (10, 15, 20, 25, 35) were tried and lead to similar conclusions. We also experimented 
with the change in the probability of having a herd size above 30 due to the transfer of one cattle. The 
results are qualitatively similar to the ones discussed below, thus we omit them.   27
represented in Figure 1.  The solid line displays the probability that the recipient’s herd 
size is greater than 30 cattle ten  years after the transfer, while the dashed line shows the 
expected change in herd size 10 years after receiving 1 cattle, inclusive of the transfer.
33  
Two features merit particular attention. First, the probability that a recipient’s herd size 
will reach the high-level asset equilibrium (>30 cattle) is S-shaped, with values less than 
1% below 7 head and reaching a plateau in the 35-45% range beginning at 22 head.  
Second, that initial herd size interval of 7-22 cattle is the only asset range over which a 
transfer is expected to yield dividends to the recipient, i.e., expected gains exceed the 1 
cattle transfer.  Our hypothesis is that this corresponds to the focal point for transfers. 
This step in our analysis is guided primarily by the very different policy 
implications of the two models. If only matches’ expected wealth drives transfer 
behavior, it would signal that, although persistent poverty plays a role, the dynamic 
threshold per se does not seem to be important. On the other hand, if expected gains 
guide the allocation of transfers, that would suggest that informal transfer arrangements 
in the presence of multiple dynamic equilibria are best understood as a safety net – a 
mechanism to prevent participants from falling into persistent poverty, as transfers may 
enable recovery onto a growth path after shocks that might otherwise cast one below the 
                                                 
33 Because our simulation procedure only considers initial herd sizes between 1 and 60 cattle, we face a 
problem in assigning values to these variables outside of that interval. We chose not to assign any values to 
these variables when herd size in 2003 is bigger than 60 given that we only lose 9 of 463 observations and 
the degree of arbitrariness in that decision would be unacceptable. The decision on what values to assign to 
the case when the match has no cattle is much more straightforward. For expected wealth, we assumed that       
Pr(herd size10 years ahead > 30| match has no cattle, gift of 1 cattle)= Pr(herd size10 years ahead > 30 | 
match has 1 cattle) = 0. For expected gains, we assumed that (expected herd size after 10 years | match has 
no cattle, gift of 1 cattle) = (expected herd size 10 years ahead | match has 1 cattle) = 1.612, and that, in 
case they receive no gift, 10 years ahead their herd size will remain 0. Clearly the interpretation of the 
dummy “match has no cattle” will now include the effect of our assumptions together with the behavioral 
component identified in our previous results.   28
threshold point at which herd dynamics bifurcate.
34 Although data limitations prevent 
interpreting our result as firm evidence in favor of one explanation over the other, we 
think this is an important question worth addressing.  
Table 7 presents the estimation results. The first column, where we replace 
match’s herd size by the corresponding value of expected wealth, offers a more direct test 
of the precautionary transfers explanation than we presented earlier. The results confirm 
our conclusion from Table 5, columns (1) and (2). We do not find support for the 
interpretation of interhousehold transfers as a form of precautionary savings in these data. 
We also find no support for the hypothesis that unconditional expected gains drive 
transfers behavior (column (2)). 
The results in columns (3) and (4) are more interesting. As in Table 5, only the 
interactions of the expected wealth or expected gains with the dummy variable “Loss” are 
statistically significant at the 5% level but, when we include both variables and their 
interactions (column (5)), our estimates reveal that the transfer decision seems to conform 
better with a model of ex post insurance in which transfers take into account the 
recipient’s expected gains but not his/her expected wealth, giving limited support to the 
model that suggests a non-monotonic relation between recipient’s wealth and transfers.  
                                                 
34 Given the standard transfer of one animal from one household to another, individual transfers can clearly 
serve this safety net purpose only for those herders quite close the unstable equilibrium.  One needs to 
recognize, however, that this limitation is purely an artifact of the two person, dyadic model we employ in 
section 2.  Anecdotal evidence from a survey of life histories collected by one of the authors suggests that 
coordinated transfers are commonly sought and obtained, raising the potential for transfers to perform the 
safety net function over a wider herd size range. This is further corroborated by anthropological work 
among the Boran (Dahl, 1979; Bassi, 1990) on the functioning of busa gonofa, an indigenous institution 
through which such coordination is achieved. Similar institutions have been analyzed among other east 
African pastoralist societies (for example, Potkanski 1999). Coordination of transfers raises a separate set 
of questions – e.g., how are the obvious free rider problems resolved? – that we cannot pursue here.    29
Finally, we check whether our central result – that transfers seem to be 
concentrated on those who lost cattle, so long as those losses do not put them “too close” 
the low-level stable equilibrium – is robust to the inclusion of additional controls 
suggested by the alternative models identified in the close of section 2. We already 
addressed the concerns of the Hoff (1997) and Murgai et al. (2002) in Table 5.  In Table 8 
column (1) we include, as additional controls, the correlation between asset levels of our 
respondents and their random matches in the nine rounds for which we have data. As 
with other covariates, we allow for the possibility of different effects upon the propensity 
to transfer cattle as a gift depending on whether this correlation is positive or negative. 
We find that these additional controls are not statistically significant and that they do not 
affect our previous estimates of the effect of match’s wealth upon the propensity to give 
cattle. The same is true when we include, in column (2), the number of siblings and its 
square as a proxy for the size of the ex ante insurance network.  Our main result appears 
robust to the inclusion of additional controls suggested by alternative models of 
exclusionary contracting for informal insurance.  
 
5. Who knows whom: Social exclusion and poverty traps 
The fact that the poorest members of the community are less likely to receive 
transfers than those near the accumulation threshold suggests a process of social 
exclusion.  If, as Santos and Barrett (2006a) claim, multiple dynamic equilibria arise only 
because of asset shocks, then insurance against asset shocks is critical to maintaining a 
viable livelihood for those of medium and high herding ability.  Yet if the asset poor 
cannot get transfers, their ability to climb out of poverty is negligible. The results   30
reported in the preceding section may even understate this effect because they are based 
only on transfer decisions relating to the subsample of random matches with whom 
respondents were already acquainted.  Given that social acquaintance logically precedes 
establishment of a transfer link, as shown in table 2, this section explores the possibility 
of wealth-dependent “social invisibility”, the implicit exclusion from transfer networks of 
those who are unknown by prospective mutual insurance partners. 
We use the same logit estimation approach from equation (1) to examine patterns 
of social acquaintance among the individuals in our sample, now using the “know” 
variable from table 5 as the regressand. Because this variable is certainly the result of past 
processes, we incorporate the effect of past dynamics (in practice, herd size transitions 
between 2000 and 2003) and not the position with respect to the different equilibria that 
we previously interpreted as a measure of future herd size. We also disregard own social 
and economic position – the Z vector – and express it as a function of the differences 
between individuals only. The results are presented in table 9. 
Being from the same clan and having less assets (cattle and land) than one’s 
match increases the probability of knowing the random match, while having more cattle 
has a negative impact, a clear demonstration of the asymmetric effects of wealth on the 
structure of social acquaintance, similar to the patterns found among crop cultivators in 
Ghana by Santos and Barrett (2005). This effect is even clearer when we consider the 
effect of a match being destitute, i.e., having no cattle.  Destitution is strongly associated 
with exclusion from social networks, as reflected in a large, negative, highly statistically 
significant coefficient estimate.  A herd size consistently at the low-level equilibrium 
appears associated with social invisibility that prevents one from entering into potentially   31
beneficial relationships.  Informal insurance arrangements cannot function for the poorest 
members of a society if they are not part of the social networks that mediate transfers. 
The nature of the channels through which this process operates is not entirely 
clear, although the anthropological literature on the Boran offers some suggestions. Dahl 
(1979), for example, refers that traditional offices are occupied by the wealthy and that 
these individuals quite often delegate the daily tasks of herd management to someone 
else, a precondition for full participation in the social and political life of the Boran.  
Lybbert et al. (2004) hypothesize that multiple herd size equilibria result from the 
involuntary sedentarization of the destitute while those with viable herds migrate.   
Seasonal migration might thereby create sufficient physical separation and differences in 
lifestyle that the poorest become invisible to many of the larger herders. Regardless of the 
precise causal mechanisms by which the apparent social invisibility of the poor arises, 
what seems clear from historical accounts is that exclusion generated by persistent 
poverty is not something new. For example, Iliffe (1987, p.42) notes that “[t]o be poor is 
one thing, but to be destitute is quite another, since it means the person so judged is 
outside the normal network of social relations and is consequently without the possibility 
of successful membership in ongoing groups, the  members of which can help him if he 
requires it. The Kanuri [in the West African savannah] say that such a person is not to be 
trusted”. 
We should note, however, that the evidence that we find for the importance of 
social invisibility in this environment is weakened once we use the QAP to obtain correct 
p-values for the variables in our model. In particular, persistently having no cattle is no 
longer significant at the 5% level (although the p-value increases only to 0.07) and the   32
asymmetries in the effects of difference in wealth become less pronounced. There are two 
possible explanations for this. First, knowing one’s match may be a less “rational” 
process than is choosing an insurance partner, leading to a greater role for unobserved 
heterogeneity for both respondent and match. Second, even if we are using all the 
relevant variables to eliminate the two-way unobserved heterogeneity concern, we only 
observe them for a relatively short period and there can be no presumption that the 
process from destitution to social invisibility is an automatic one. For example, the 
decision to move to a larger urban center as a consequence of utter destitution is not 
quickly or easily undertaken. This raises the theoretically and empirically interesting 
question of describing the dynamics of these networks, a topic that, unfortunately we 
cannot address with these data and therefore leave to future research. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper presented a simple analytical model of the implications of 
nonstationary wealth dynamics for patterns of informal insurance and established that 
data from a population among which poverty traps have been previously identified 
support the hypothesis that informal insurance follows this hypothesized process rather 
than that of the standard informal insurance model or a model of precautionary transfers.  
Livestock transfers among these herders appear to be triggered by herd losses so long as 
those losses leave the prospective transfer recipient not “too poor”.  For the poorest 
herders, their destitution induces prospective partners to rationally exclude them from 
informal insurance arrangements, even though they know each other. These patterns of 
interhousehold transfers differ significantly from those predicted by the informal mutual   33
insurance model that has become the workhorse of economic analysis of interhousehold 
transfers. Under the informal insurance model, and controlling for losses, transfers should 
be a function of losses only and independent of ex post wealth.  The data reject this 
hypothesis in favor of the ex post wealth dependence that our model predicts. 
This wealth-differentiated insurance effect is compounded by the fact that the 
poor are less socially visible than somewhat wealthier neighbors.  Because being known 
is a necessary condition for receiving transfers, the social invisibility of the destitute 
compounds their rational exclusion from informal insurance networks, leaving them 
vulnerable to shocks and largely without informal networks to fall back on in times of 
need. 
Although, the existence of asset thresholds at which wealth and welfare dynamics 
bifurcate highlights the criticality of safety nets designed to catch people suffering shocks 
so as to enable them to recover and to keep them from falling into long-term destitution, 
data limitations prevent us from presenting conclusive evidence regarding such a direct 
role for this threshold in shaping informal transfers. For that reason, we use simulated 
herd dynamics data to distinguish between two models, one in which transfers are guided 
by post-transfer expected wealth, against an alternative model in which recipients’ 
expected gains from a transfer affect giving patterns. Our results favor the latter 
explanation. The testing between these competing explanations is a point that we hope 
pursue later, with other data that might allow for more direct testing. 
Nonstationary wealth dynamics have profound repercussions for public policies to 
address problems of persistent poverty and asset loss. Because transfers have, literally, 
life or death consequences in contexts such as the rangelands of southern Ethiopia, it is   34
hard to derive conclusions about optimal redistributive policies simply from our 
econometric results (Cohen-Cole, Durlauf and Rondina 2005).  Nevertheless, our results 
speak to the widespread concern that external transfers from governments, donors or 
international nongovernmental organizations may crowd out existing informal 
arrangements.  Boran pastoralists seem to act in such a way that clearly marginalizes 
those who are trapped into poverty.  In this context, worries about the crowding out effect 
of public interventions seem misplaced, as the poorer members are clearly left uninsured, 
a result also supported by the historical evidence on east African pastoralist societies. In 
fact, our model and empirical results suggest that, up to some wealth level, public 
transfers may even lead to the crowding-in of private transfers, as a recent analysis of 
private transfers in the Philippines likewise suggests (Cox, Hansen and Jimenez 2004). 
This result is no surprise in a context where transfers are risk-sharing mechanisms 
motivated by exchange/reciprocity considerations, in which case there may be a positive 
correlation between the welfare of the recipient and a private transfer because better-off 
recipients will be better placed to reciprocate a transfer in the future.  
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No 65  3  68 
Yes 370  123  493 
Total 435  126  561 
 
 
Table 3: Models of informal insurance 
Conditional on losses?   
Yes No 
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Table 4: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description  Mean 
(std dev) 




Same clan  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if both i and j belong to the same clan  0.19 
(0.39) 












Older  Absolute value of the age difference between i and j if i is older, 0 otherwise  8.48 
(12.92) 
Younger  Absolute value of the age difference between i and j if i is younger, 0 otherwise  8.18 
(12.91) 
















Bigger family  Absolute value of the difference in family size between i and j if i has a bigger family than 
j, 0 otherwise 
1.59 
(2.40) 
Smaller family  Absolute value of the difference in family size between i and j if i has a smaller family 
than j, 0 otherwise 
1.66 
(2.50) 
Match has no cattle  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if j has no cattle in September 2003  0.15 
(0.36) 




E2: intermediate herd size, 
below threshold 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if j has more than 4 but less than 15 cattle in September 2003  0.54 
(0.50) 
E3: intermediate herd size, 
above threshold 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if j has more than 14 but less than 40 cattle in September 2003  0.12 
(0.33) 
E4: wealthy  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if j has more than 39 cattle in September 2003  0.03 
(0.16) 












Expected wealth  Probability that the match will have a herd bigger than 30 cattle, 10 years after having 
received a gift of one cattle, given current (2003) herd size. 
0.065 
(0.101) 
Expected gains  Difference in match’s expected herd size, after 10 years, conditional on receiving a gift of 
one cattle, given current (2003) herd size 
1.063 
(0.327) 
Dida Hara  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Dida Hara  0.258 
(0.438) 
Dillo  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Dillo  0.258 
(0.438)   43
Qorate  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the respondent lives in Qorate  0.261 
(0.439) 
   44
Table 5: Logit Estimates of Gift Giving Patterns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.357 0.275 0.140 1.207 
[0.517] [0.653] [0.828] [0.226] 
match has no cattle 
(0.237) (0.321) (0.419) (0.103) 
-0.014 -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 
[0.592] [0.564] [0.535] [0.594] 
match's herd size 
(0.388) (0.330) (0.306) (0.252) 
-0.092 0.275 -0.387 
[0.848] [0.580] [0.588] 
E2 
(0.444) (0.299) (0.286) 
0.203 0.655 0.005 
[0.801] [0.429] [0.996] 
E3 
(0.377) (0.201) (0.469) 
-0.611 -0.019 -0.734 
[0.777] [0.993] [0.757] 
E4 















cattle loss * no cattle 
(0.046) 
0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
[0.520] [0.422] [0.568] [0.579] 
more cattle 
(0.303) (0.286) (0.327) (0.293) 
0.018 0.030 0.032 0.034 
[0.530] [0.341] [0.310] [0.290] 
less cattle 
(0.387) (0.245) (0.235) (0.143) 
1.828 1.825 1.872 1.920 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
same clan 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.123 1.105 1.163 1.413 
[0.040] [0.056] [0.056] [0.016] 
male, male 
(0.036) (0.045) (0.034) (0.009) 
1.234 1.229 1.226 1.259 
[0.027] [0.028] [0.030] [0.019] 
male, female 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.011) 
0.650 0.580 0.618 0.963 
[0.225] [0.308] [0.303] [0.099] 
female, male 
(0.091) (0.118) (0.105) (0.014)   45
Observations 493 493 493 493 
Number of clusters  115 115 115 115 
Log pseudolikelihood  -211.19 -210.60 -208.03 -204.29 
Pseudo R-squared  0.237 0.240 0.249 0.262 
Adjusted count R-squared  0.293 0.285 0.285 0.341 
Values within brackets are robust p-values. Values within parentheses are 
QAP-corrected p-values. Values in Bold are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level or lower. Values in Bold are statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level or lower when p-values are obtained through 
the QAP. Distance, differences in age, land owned, family size, and 
respondent’s age and family size, together with village-specific dummy 
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Table 6: Logit Estimates of Gift Giving Patterns: The effect of herder ability 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






Low 1.137  1.638  0.376  0.490  1.334  3.767 
Medium 2.542  1.695  0.435  0.347  2.616  3.710 
E2 * low  1.372  1.679      -0.248  0.717 
E2 * medium  -1.145  1.777      1.528  0.941 
E2 *high  1.607  2.353      2.720  3.713 
cattle loss * E2 * low  dropped*        
cattle loss * E2 * medium  2.856  1.123        
cattle loss * E2 * high  2.500  0.925        
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors obtained using 200 replicates. All the covariates present in table 5, column 4, 
were included, but are not reported. Variables in bold are statistically significant at the 5% significance level or 
lower.  
* In the model presented under column (1), the variable “cattle loss * E2 * low” predicts failure perfectly – the 
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Table 7: Logit Estimates of Gift Giving Patterns: 
Expected wealth vs. Expected gains 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0.669  -0.865  -0.501 
(1.705)  (1.683)  (1.764) 
Expected wealth 
[3.353]  [2.381]  [2.419] 
 0.139  0.229  0.353 
 (0.569)  (0.580)  (0.624) 
Expected gains 
 [0.644]  [0.688]  [0.768] 
   21.868   -7.995 
   (8.554)   (13.058) 
Loss * Expected wealth 
   [11.013]  [18.675] 
    1.555 1.849 
    (0.462)  (0.652) 
Loss * expected gains 
    [0.547]  [0.898] 
Observations  484 484 484 484 484 
Note: The values within parenthesis are robust standard errors and the values within 
brackets are bootstrapped standard errors, obtained using 200 replicates. All the 
covariates present in Table 5, column 4 (except those expressing herd’s position with 
respect to the different equilibria and their interactions) were included in the 
regression but are not reported. Values in Bold are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level or lower when considering bootstrapped standard errors.   48
Table 8: Logit estimates of Gift-giving patterns: 
Additional explanations 
 
 (1) (2) 
Match has no cattle  0.347 2.130 
 [0.906] [0.417] 
Match’s herd size  -0.029 -0.013 
 [0.480] [0.730] 
E1 0.775 0.814 
 [0.767] [0.739] 
E2 0.482 0.568 
 [0.837] [0.800] 
E3 0.743 0.919 
 [0.704] [0.622] 
Loss * match has no cattle  0.500 -1.143 
 [0.734] [0.221] 
Loss * E1  0.379 0.498 
 [0.625] [0.547] 
Loss * E2  2.100 1.663 
 [0.000] [0.001] 
Negative correlation  -0.273  
 [0.736]  
Positive correlation  0.886  
 [0.222]  
Number of brothers  -0.077 
 [0.761] 
Number of brothers squared  0.020 
 [0.515] 
Observations 436 452 
Number of respondents  107.000 104.000 
Log pseudolikelihood  -182.705 -190.751 
Pseudo R-squared  0.265 0.274 
Adjusted count R-squared  0.339 0.364 
Note: robust p-values within brackets. Values in Bold are 
significant at the 5%level of significance or smaller. All the 
covariates present in Table 5, column 4 were included in the 
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Table 9: Logit Estimates of Social Acquaintance Networks 
 




no cattle since 2000  -1.106  0.025 0.070 
E1 since 2000  -0.145 0.736  0.392 
E2 since 2000  -0.127 0.639  0.379 
E3 since 2000  -0.581 0.558  0.485 
E4 since 2000  -1.297 0.287  0.284 
cattle loss since 2000  0.203 0.466  0.356 
More cattle  -0.014  0.009 0.096 
less cattle  0.040  0.001 0.043 
Distance -0.007  0.323  0.201 
Same clan  0.743  0.015 0.033 
Male, male  0.684  0.081  0.118 
Male, female  0.177  0.671  0.359 
female, male  0.618  0.084  0.121 
Older  -0.026  0.013 0.005 
Younger -0.000  0.971  0.515 
more land  0.143  0.215  0.193 
less land  0.482  0.001 0.013 
bigger family  0.042  0.499  0.264 
smaller family  -0.097  0.088  0.111 
Observations 745 
Number of respondents  85 
Log pseudolikelihood  -256.124 
Pseudo R-squared  0.229 
Adjusted count R-squared  0.041 
 
Note: Values in Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 
or lower. Values in Bold italics remain statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance or lower for p-values obtained through QAP. Village dummies and a 
constant were included in the estimation but are not reported here. Being from 
Qorate predicts being known perfectly – the variable was dropped and 300 
observations were not used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 